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Reports of disappearing gla-ciers, shrinking arctic ice, rising sea levels, stronger hur-
ricanes, and unprecedented Euro-
pean heat waves combined with an 
inexorable buildup in atmospheric 
carbon dioxide levels is increasing 
pressure on governments to respond 
with new greenhouse gas initia-
tives. California and other states are 
providing policy leadership in the 
United States. 
Of particular interest to the 
biofuels industry is Governor Ar-
nold Schwarzenegger’s January 2007 
executive order that requires a 10 per-
cent reduction in the carbon content 
of California’s transportation fuels by 
2020. In contrast to federal renewable 
fuel standards, which mandate levels 
of use of biofuels, California’s fuel 
standard does not tell fuel suppliers 
(oil companies) how they should meet 
the new requirements. Alternative 
fuels will have to compete in terms of 
cost and carbon content. Only those 
fuels that can reduce carbon content 
at reasonable cost will be included in 
California fuel blends. Given that etha-
nol from corn comprises more than 
90 percent of U.S. alternative fuels, a 
key determinant of the feasibility of 
meeting California’s ambitious goals 
is the extent to which corn ethanol 
reduces greenhouse gas emissions.
Accounting for Corn Ethanol’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Whether corn ethanol reduces net 
greenhouse gas emissions has been 
studied by many, and many different 
answers have been found. Some-
times the difference in answers rests 
on assumptions. For example, Pro-
fessor David Pimental from Cornell 
University attributes all greenhouse 
gas emissions from ethanol plants 
to ethanol rather than attributing a 
portion to distillers grains, which 
displace feed (more about this lat-
er). But sometimes the differences 
in answers are caused by research-
ers answering different questions. 
To illustrate the process that re-
searchers follow to calculate green-
house gas emissions we answer the 
following question: Does expansion 
of Iowa corn production to produce 
ethanol help reduce the buildup of 
greenhouse gases? If the answer is 
yes, then corn-based ethanol pro-
duced from Iowa corn may qualify 
as a low-carbon fuel. If not, then the 
future of the current ethanol indus-
try may be threatened because it 
may not help California meet its fuel 
composition target. 
To answer this question re-
quires careful accounting of the 
differences in production and 
consumption that lead to changes 
in greenhouse gas emissions. The 
method commonly used to estimate 
greenhouse gas emissions is to 
conduct a life cycle analysis of the 
feedstock used to make biofuels. We 
present results of a life cycle analy-
sis for Iowa corn from planting to re-
fi ning to burning as fuel. In addition, 
we also consider changes in emis-
sions caused by land use changes 
that are attributable to expansion 
of corn production. These land use 
changes can occur both domesti-
cally and overseas. 
Fuel Consumption 
Energy content is typically mea-
sured by megajoules (MJ). Gasoline 
contains approximately 121 MJ per 
gallon. A gallon of ethanol contains 
67.4 percent of the energy content 
of gasoline so it takes 1.48 gallons of 
ethanol to replace the energy con-
tent of a gallon of gasoline. Green-
house gas emissions, whether from 
methane, nitrous oxide, or carbon 
dioxide, are all measured in units of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2eq). 
Life cycle analyses of gasoline 
suggest that transportation of oil, 
refi ning oils into gasoline, and burn-
ing the gasoline in cars releases 94 
grams of CO2eq per megajoule. This 
is the carbon content of gasoline. If 
corn growth required only photo-
synthesis, if ethanol were produced 
using solar power, if corn were 
instantly transported to ethanol 
plants, and if no land use changes 
were needed to grow the corn, then 
displacing a gallon of gasoline with 
ethanol would reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions by approximately 11.2 
kilograms (kg) of CO2eq. 
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However, fossil fuels are used to 
grow corn and produce ethanol. In 
addition, using corn to produce eth-
anol means that fewer acres will be 
devoted to competing crops, more 
land will be brought into cultivation, 
and other uses of corn will decline. 
The greenhouse gas implications of 
all these factors need to be con-
sidered before we can determine if 
corn ethanol is a low-carbon fuel. 
Biorefi nery Phase
Corn ethanol is produced in either 
a dry mill or a wet mill plant. Most 
new ethanol plants are dry mills, so 
that is what we focus on here. Con-
verting corn to ethanol in a dry mill 
plant requires energy to transport 
corn to the plant, prepare the corn 
for fermentation, ferment the corn, 
and distill the ethanol from the 
fermented product. The two key fac-
tors that determine the greenhouse 
gas emissions from a dry mill plant 
are whether the plant dries the dis-
tillers grains or sells them wet and 
whether the plant’s energy source is 
coal or natural gas. 
A dry mill plant that dries distill-
ers grains requires about 38 MJ to 
produce a gallon of ethanol. If distill-
ers grains are not dried, the en-
ergy is reduced to about 26 MJ per 
gallon. Coal-powered plants emit 
62 percent more CO2eq than plants 
that use natural gas. 
The contribution of ethanol to 
reducing greenhouse gas buildup is 
reduced by biorefi nery emissions. 
Not all the greenhouse gas emissions 
of a dry mill plant should be allo-
cated to ethanol because the plant 
also produces distillers grains, which 
displace other sources of animal 
feed, thereby reducing the green-
house gas emissions associate with 
the displaced feed. Table 1 shows 
the amount of emissions that occurs 
depending on the source of energy 
(coal or natural gas) and on whether 
distillers grains are dried or not. 
Direct Agricultural Phase
Accounting for the fossil fuel used 
to produce corn further reduces 
the net reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions. Fossil fuels are used 
directly in the form of diesel fuel or 
indirectly to produce fertilizer, pesti-
cides, and other agricultural inputs. 
The two most important determi-
nants of greenhouse gas emissions 
per gallon of ethanol in the agricul-
tural phase are the yield per acre of 
land and the amount of nitrogen fer-
tilizer used. And both of these are 
infl uenced by whether corn is grown 
after soybeans or after corn. 
If there were no ethanol de-
mand, it is likely that Iowa farmers 
would plant most of their corn crop 
after a crop of soybeans. Yields 
are higher and nitrogen fertilizer 
costs are lower. The higher yields 
and lower nitrogen rates have a 
direct impact on carbon emis-
sions. If yields of corn planted after 
corn are 10 percent lower than for 
corn planted after soybeans, then 
CO2eq emissions per bushel for 
corn planted after corn would be 10 
percent higher than corn planted 
after soybeans. But the difference in 
emission is greater than 10 percent 
because nitrogen fertilizer applica-
tion rates are typically 50 pounds 
per acre higher for corn planted 
after corn. Each additional pound 
of applied nitrogen contributes an 
additional 5 kg in CO2eq emissions. 
The reason for this high emission 
Table 1. CO2 emitted (kg) per gallon of gasoline displaced at the 
biorefi nery stage
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rate is that nitrous oxide has a glob-
al warming potential more than 300 
times that of CO2. The combination 
of a lower corn yield and a higher 
nitrogen rate (and accounting for 
some other small differences) in-
creases emissions from this phase 
of ethanol production from 3.5 kg to 
4.8 kg CO2eq per gallon of gasoline 
displaced. 
A reasonable presumption is 
that increased ethanol produc-
tion in Iowa comes primarily from 
increased acreage of corn planted 
after corn. Figure 1 shows the re-
sulting net greenhouse reductions. 
As shown, it appears that expansion 
of Iowa corn production for etha-
nol does indeed reduce net green-
house gas emissions, even when the 
ethanol is produced in a coal-fi red 
plant. However, before we can make 
a fi nal conclusion, we need to con-
sider possible changes in emissions 
caused by changes in land use.
Induced Changes in Land Use
Increased production of corn for 
ethanol production will affect land 
use both domestically and overseas. 
Domestically, most of the increase 
in corn production will come about 
because farmers will switch their 
land from an alternative crop to corn. 
Most of the switching will involve 
soybean acreage because most of the 
corn is grown alongside soybeans. 
We have already accounted for the 
emissions from growing corn. When 
the additional corn is grown on what 
would have been a soybean acre, 
there is an emission credit equal to 
the amount of emissions associated 
with soybean production. Under 
Iowa conditions the amount of credit 
equals about 1.5 kg CO2eq per gallon 
of gasoline displaced.
Some corn grown for expanded 
ethanol use could also come from 
conversion of land that would not 
have been cropped otherwise. 
Virgin land with a mature forest or 
grassland contains as much carbon 
as it is ever going to. In contrast, 
land that has been previously tilled 
but is currently not being cropped 
is gaining carbon in soil or trees. 
Therefore, tilling virgin land releas-
es more immediate carbon than till-
ing land that is gaining carbon. But 
growing crops on previously tilled 
land results in the loss of the carbon 
that would have accumulated on the 
land in future years. The loss of the 
annual increase in carbon accumu-
lation needs to be accounted for if 
previously tilled land is cropped.
An example of previously 
cultivated land is acreage that is 
enrolled in the Conservation Re-
serve Program (CRP). The Chicago 
Climate Exchange assumes that 
farmers who convert cropland to 
grassland will sequester 750 kg 
CO2eq per acre per year. If we use 
this as the amount of lost seques-
tration and if we assume also that 
an equivalent annualized amount 
of soil carbon stocks will be lost 
from land conversion, then a debit 
of 5.3 kg CO2eq per gallon of gaso-
line displaced needs to be sub-
tracted from the Figure 1 numbers. 
This debit makes ethanol produc-
tion from corn a net contributor 
to greenhouse gas in all cases. 
Although the actual debit on CRP 
land may be higher or lower than 
5.3 kg, this example illustrates 
just how sensitive is the measure 
of ethanol’s net greenhouse gas 
contribution.
To date, expansion of U.S. corn 
production for ethanol has primar-
ily involved substitution of corn 
for another crop and not conver-
sion of land. Thus, we conclude 
that corn-based ethanol reduces 
greenhouse gas emissions. How-
ever, this conclusion may not hold 
if we extend our accounting bound-
ary to include land use changes in 
other countries.
As explained earlier, expansion 
of U.S. corn production for ethanol 
will reduce U.S. soybean production. 
But world soybean demand will be 
unaffected. The result is an increase 
in world soybean prices and a sig-
nal for other countries to expand 
production. If this production takes 
place solely through switching from 
lower-value crops to soybeans, then 
only the difference in emission rates 
between the two crops can be at-
tributable to U.S. ethanol production. 
Because a soybean crop is a low car-
bon emitter, such a difference would 
likely result in a credit being added 
to U.S. ethanol. However, if soybean 
expansion occurs through conversion 
of grassland or forestland, then the 
immediate loss in carbon might be 
attributable to U.S. ethanol. This latter 
case presents a potential hurdle that 
must be overcome before U.S. ethanol 
can be considered a low-carbon fuel.
Figure 1. Life cycle emission reduction for corn ethanol in Iowa
Continued on page 10
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The most vexing problem facing Congress as it works toward completion of the farm 
bill is where to fi nd funding to make 
changes in farm legislation. High 
commodity prices have drastically 
reduced available funds that sup-
porters of change can tap to create 
new programs or expand existing 
programs. The agricultural commit-
tees have found only two signifi cant 
sources of funds under their con-
trol: direct payments and the crop 
insurance program. Reductions in 
either program could fund increased 
nutrition and conservation pro-
grams or could be used to redesign 
commodity programs. The rationale 
for cutting direct payments is that it 
is diffi cult to see why crop farmers 
should receive subsidy payments 
when farm income is at record lev-
els. The rationale for cutting crop 
insurance subsidies is that taxpayer 
support for the program has bal-
looned with the higher commodity 
prices, far outstripping the costs of 
actually running the program. 
The House-passed farm bill 
kept direct payments in place but 
reduced crop insurance funding. 
About half of the House cuts to crop 
insurance are real and about half 
are budget sleights of hand that 
involve moving payments from one 
fi scal year to the next. At press time, 
the Senate had yet to act on a farm 
bill but indications are that the Sen-
ate will also choose to reduce crop 
insurance funding. The fi nal farm 
bill will be written by a conference 
committee and the choice for the 
conference committee will be the 
same: if changes are to be made in 
the farm bill, the only two places to 
fund such changes are reductions in 
direct payments or funding reduc-
tions to crop insurance.
How to Save Billions in Farm Spending 
One justifi cation for cutting crop 
insurance to help fund commodity 
program reform is that most crop 
insurance subsidies are targeted at 
the same crops that receive farm 
program payments. Table 1 shows 
a breakdown in crop insurance pro-
gram costs attributable to program 
crops from 2005 to 2007. (The 2007 
payments are estimated.) Program 
crops account for more than 80 per-
cent of the costs of the crop insur-
ance program, and this share has 
increased signifi cantly over the last 
three years. More than $5 billion is 
now being spent on providing crop 
insurance to program crop produc-
ers, an amount that is about equal 
to the annual direct payments that 
the same producers receive. 
Figure 1 shows the share of total 
crop insurance premium for pro-
gram crops accounted for by each 
crop. As is readily apparent from the 
Table 1. Crop insurance subsidies for program crops
Note: Program crops include barley, corn, cotton, grain sorghum, oats, peanuts, rice, 
soybeans, and wheat.
aEstimated assuming that the 2007 aggregate loss ratio is 0.8.
Figure 1. Share of premium generated by each program crop
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data in Table 1 and Figure 1, when 
we talk about the crops affected by 
the crop insurance program, we are 
really talking about one large crop—
corn—and three other crops—soy-
beans, wheat, and cotton. 
The Table 1 data illustrates that 
signifi cant funds could be obtained 
from the crop insurance program, 
either through cuts in premium sub-
sidies, underwriting gains, or A&O 
(administrative and operating) reim-
bursements. Defenders of the pro-
gram, however, argue that it would 
be counterproductive to cut any of 
these three items. They say premium 
subsidies are needed to get farmers 
to buy insurance, and company profi t 
levels generated by taxpayer-subsi-
dized underwriting gains and A&O 
are in line with what commercial 
insurance providers generate from 
the private market. (See, for example, 
testimony from Ron Brichler, senior 
vice president of Great American 
Insurance Company, before the 
General Farm Commodities and Risk 
Management Subcommittee, House 
Committee on Agriculture, June 7, 
2007.) It follows, then, that any cuts 
from these levels would reduce pro-
gram participation by both farmers 
and private companies.
Understanding the implications 
of cuts in direct payments is simple 
because they are so transparent. 
However, the crop insurance pro-
gram is so complicated that few 
actually understand how the pro-
gram works and what would happen 
if program funding were cut. But 
by taking a closer look at the pro-
gram, we can estimate what could 
be saved and with what impacts. 
First, let’s look at producer premium 
subsidies.
Impacts of Reducing Producer  
Premium Subsidies
Farmers will choose to buy crop 
insurance if the benefi ts they derive 
from it are greater than its price. 
The fi rst benefi t is the standard 
insurance benefi t obtained from 
knowledge that crop losses in ex-
cess of the insurance deductible will 
be covered. Experience has shown 
that this insurance benefi t alone 
is insuffi cient motivation for most 
farmers to buy crop insurance. It 
must be, then, that crop insurance 
is a cost ineffective way for farmers 
to protect themselves against crop 
losses. Thus, to boost participa-
tion, Congress increased premium 
subsidies to the point at which most 
farmers fi nd it diffi cult to resist. But 
even with taxpayers paying more 
than half their premium, many farm-
ers claim that the program still does 
not generate enough payments rela-
tive to what they are asked to pay. 
Figure 2 shows the “break-even” 
percent subsidy for farmers in major 
corn- and wheat-producing states. 
Presented are the levels of premium 
subsidy that if applied to recent 
premium rates would equate farm-
er-paid premiums with expected 
indemnity payments for producers 
of corn, soybeans, wheat, rice, and 
grain sorghum in each state. Expect-
ed indemnity payments are calcu-
lated for two periods: 1980 to 2005 
and 1995 to 2005. The longer period 
is more indicative of expected in-
demnities if patterns of crop losses 
in the 1980s and early 1990s are pos-
sible in the future.
The break-even premium sub-
sidy for Iowa is 38 percent if future 
crop losses follow the 1980 to 2005 
pattern or 53 percent if the more re-
cent past is indicative of future loss-
es. This means that Iowa farmers 
have no profi t motivation for buying 
crop insurance until the premium 
subsidy gets substantial. The same 
result holds for Illinois, Nebraska, 
Minnesota, and Indiana. The nega-
tive break-even premium subsidies 
in Ohio, Kansas, and the Dakotas 
indicate that farmers in these states 
do not need a premium subsidy to 
break even because their premium 
rates are already low enough. 
The Figure 2 data indicate that 
Corn Belt farmers would not buy 
crop insurance if it were not heav-
ily subsidized whereas farmers in 
important wheat states would have 
a profi t motive to buy crop insur-
ance even without premium subsi-
dizes. Given that corn and soybeans 
together represent about 60 percent 
of the entire crop insurance pro-
gram, it is only a bit of an overstate-
ment to say that the crop insurance 
industry is selling a product with 
so little demand at its current price 
that without government price 
subsidies, there would be no viable 
market. This conclusion is rein-
forced by the fact that unlike private 
insurance products, crop insurance 
Figure 2. Premium subsidy required for program crop farmers to break 
even on crop insurance
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premiums do not cover the cost of 
selling, servicing, and reinsuring 
the insurance policies. Instead, the 
government provides direct support 
to insurance providers through A&O 
reimbursements and reinsurance. If 
premiums were set to cover these 
costs, the break-even premium 
subsidies in Figure 2 would be much 
greater.
This lack of market for unsub-
sidized crop insurance means that 
substantial savings could accrue 
from a reduction in premium sub-
sidies. Direct savings would come 
about because farmers would be 
asked to pay more for their insur-
ance. However, the indirect savings 
from a reduction in premium subsi-
dies would likely be much greater 
than the direct savings. Depending 
on how the cut in premium subsi-
dies was implemented, it is likely 
that farmers would buy less insur-
ance. This decision would reduce 
their premium, which would reduce 
the per-acre premium subsidy and 
automatically trigger reductions 
in A&O reimbursements and un-
derwriting gains. Of course, such a 
move would reverse the policy of 
trying to maximize participation in 
the program. The House chose to re-
duce premium subsidies but only for 
a subset of crop insurance policies 
(GRIP and GRP). This choice limits 
the indirect savings, as many farm-
ers will simply move to products 
that receive higher subsidies. 
Growth in Administrative and  
Operating Reimbursements
The best measure of changes in the 
actual cost of selling and servicing 
crop insurance policies is changes 
in the number of policies sold. 
Although larger farms will tend 
to involve a bit more work than 
smaller farms, most of the cost is 
determined by the number of poli-
cies. Table 2 provides data that give 
insight into A&O reimbursements 
from 2005 to 2007.
Using 2005 as a base year as-
sumes that company reimburse-
ments in that year were enough to 
allow an adequate level of service to 
be provided to producers of pro-
gram crops. As shown, the number 
of policies sold to producers of 
program crops has fallen since 2005, 
yet, as shown in Table 2, total A&O 
reimbursements have dramatically 
increased over this period. 
To put this growth into context, 
the House farm bill would reduce 
A&O reimbursements by about 14.5 
percent. However, to hold A&O reim-
bursements per policy constant at 
their 2005 levels for program crops 
would require a 40 percent reduction 
in A&O reimbursements. An alterna-
tive way to provide A&O reimburse-
ments would be to base them on pol-
icy count rather than as a percentage 
of premiums. This change would cre-
ate an equal incentive for companies 
and agents to sell crop insurance to 
small and large farmers and it would 
not result in dramatic year-to-year 
changes in taxpayer costs that bear 
no refl ection to actual industry costs. 
A reduction in A&O would be felt 
most directly in a reduction in crop 
insurance agent commissions. If per-
policy A&O reimbursements were 
reduced to 2005 levels, then agent 
commissions would also be reduced 
to 2005 levels. If these levels were 
adequate to sell and service policies 
in 2005, then they are likely adequate 
today. If not, then consolidation in 
the number of agents selling crop 
insurance would occur.
Reductions in Underwriting Gains
Another way that Congress could 
cut crop insurance program costs 
is through a reduction in net under-
writing gains, defi ned as the differ-
ence between premiums collected 
and indemnities paid after account-
ing for the subsidized reinsurance 
that is provided by USDA. The 
House farm bill cuts program costs 
by increasing the “net book quota 
share” from 5 percent to at least 12.5 
percent. This quota share is the per-
centage of net underwriting gains 
that companies must pay to USDA 
when their gains are positive and 
it is the percentage of losses that 
the companies do not have to cover 
when net gains are negative. 
An increase in this quota share 
would be cost neutral if the prob-
ability and average magnitude of 
a loss equals the probability and 
average magnitude of a gain. But, as 
shown in Figure 2, premiums exceed 
expected indemnities in the Corn 
Belt. And because most of the crop 
insurance program consists of Corn 
Belt business, the probability of a 
gain is larger than the probability of 
a loss. Furthermore, the reinsurance 
provided by USDA treats losses dif-
ferently than gains. 
A good way to gain insight into 
the effects of an increase in quota 
share is by looking at the “value-at-
risk” curve facing the crop insur-
ance industry. Value-at-risk curves 
show the probability that underwrit-
Table 2. Growth in operating costs and reimbursements since 2005 for 
program crops
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ing gains will be less than a given 
level. Figure 3 shows the value-at-
risk curve with and without reinsur-
ance for the crop insurance industry 
from insuring program crops with 
premiums set at 2007 levels. The 
1980 to 2005 level of risk is embod-
ied in these curves. The risk would 
be much less than that shown if the 
1995 to 2005 level of risk were used.
Providing crop insurance to 
farmers is risky business. With-
out reinsurance, there is a 1-in-200 
chance that losses will exceed $8 
billion. The reinsurance provided 
by USDA reduces the 1-in-200 loss to 
$2.8 billion with a maximum pos-
sible loss of $3.6 billion. This loss 
was calculated by assuming that 
companies place all their program 
crop business in the riskiest/high-
est-profi t reinsurance fund and 
that USDA reinsurance is based on 
industry losses rather than indi-
vidual company losses. The reinsur-
ance also reduces the probability 
of a loss from 39 to 30 percent. This 
means that in 7 years out of 10, crop 
insurance companies should expect 
to have positive underwriting gains, 
which means that an increase in 
quota share will reduce program 
costs 70 percent of the time while 
increasing costs only 30 percent of 
the time. This asymmetry between 
gains and losses explains why in-
creasing the net book quota share 
will reduce taxpayer costs of the 
program. Every 5 percent increase 
in quota share reduces program 
costs by about $27 million. 
Where to Cut?
Congress has the opportunity to 
offset increased farm bill program 
costs by targeting cuts to crop 
insurance, which has generated 
tremendous growth in program 
costs. Signifi cant savings are avail-
able through reductions in premium 
subsidies, A&O reimbursements, 
and net underwriting gains. Reduc-
tions in premium subsidies would 
likely generate the greatest sav-
ings because farmers would likely 
respond by dramatically reducing 
the amount of insurance they buy, 
which would automatically reduce 
program costs. Because the growth 
in A&O reimbursements has far out-
paced actual increases in program 
operating delivery costs, signifi cant 
savings could also be realized by 
changing the way A&O is calculated. 
For example, capping per-policy 
A&O reimbursements at 2005 levels 
would generate annual savings of 
almost $450 million. And every 10 
percent reduction in the risk expo-
sure of crop insurance companies 
through expansion of the reinsur-
ance quota share could generate 
more than $50 million in savings 
up to a maximum annual savings of 
more than $500 million.
The choice available to Con-
gress is clear: the only two signifi -
cant sources of budget offsets to 
pay for the cost of changing direc-
tion with the 2007 farm are crop 
insurance and direct payments. If 
Congress chooses to cut crop insur-
ance and it does not want to reduce 
producers’ incentives to buy insur-
ance, then it will need to target A&O 
and underwriting gains. The impact 
of such reductions would be small 
initially because recent growth in 
both has been substantial. But com-
bined cuts in excess of perhaps $500 
million per year would likely begin 
to change the crop insurance deliv-
ery system, with fewer, larger crop 
insurance agencies. ◆
Figure 3. Value-at-risk curve for crop insurance companies with and 
without USDA reinsurance
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Agricultural Situation
Spotlight
Blending: Ethanol’s New Growth Sector
Chad E. Hart
chart@iastate.edu
515-294-9911
The evolution of the ethanol industry continues at a brisk pace. U.S. ethanol production 
capacity has grown tremendously 
over the past several years. But 
recent lower ethanol prices, com-
bined with still strong corn prices, 
have put a damper on continued 
expansion. Figure 1 shows the price 
movements for ethanol in 2007. 
At the beginning of the year, the 
ethanol price started out at around 
$2.50 per gallon. But prices have 
backed off since then, with recent 
ethanol prices at between $1.50 and 
$1.70 per gallon. This price drop has 
tightened margins at ethanol plants 
across the nation. But at the same 
time, the price drop has provided 
new growth opportunities in etha-
nol, on the blending side.
Ethanol Blends
Ethanol is blended with gasoline 
for a variety of reasons. It is an 
octane booster; it is an alternative 
fuel source for use in conventional 
fuels; and it is an additive that can 
be used to meet Clean Air Act stan-
dards. Ethanol received a boost 
by means of this last reason when 
the additive MTBE was removed 
from the market. Figure 2 shows the 
percentage of U.S. gasoline that has 
been blended with ethanol since 
January 2005. The MTBE removal 
occurred mostly in May 2006, 
and the graph shows the jump in 
ethanol blending, from 35 percent 
to 45 percent, over the course of 
that month. Ethanol blending has 
exceeded 50 percent for a couple of 
months over the past year at times 
when ethanol prices have dropped. 
These monthly spikes are likely due 
to ethanol being used as a relative-
ly cheaper alternative fuel source 
for conventional fuels. And given 
ethanol’s current pricing situation, 
this type of usage will continue to 
grow as more ethanol enters the 
Figure 1. Nearby futures prices for ethanol
Figure 2. Percentage of U.S. gasoline blended with ethanol
fuel market as part of conventional 
gasoline.
Regional Differences
The gasoline market can be broken 
down into two components: the con-
ventional and the reformulated gaso-
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line markets. Reformulated gasoline 
is gasoline that is manufactured to 
meet Clean Air Act requirements and 
is mainly marketed in large urban 
areas on the East and West Coasts. 
It was in this reformulated gasoline 
market that ethanol replaced MTBE. 
Table 1 outlines U.S. ethanol blend-
ing in July 2007. In that month, over 
11 billion gallons of gasoline was 
produced, and nearly half of that 
total was blended with ethanol. 
Roughly two-thirds of the ethanol-
blended fuel entered the reformu-
lated gasoline market, with the rest 
entering the conventional gasoline 
market. But when you look at various 
regions of the country, the blending 
story changes. On the coasts and in 
the southern United States, nearly all 
of the ethanol-blended fuel is refor-
mulated. But for the Midwest and 
Northern Plains, most of the ethanol-
blended fuel is sold as conventional 
gasoline. With ethanol-blended fuel 
already dominating the reformulated 
gasoline market, the new growth 
area for ethanol is in the convention-
al gasoline market.
Figure 3 shows the usage of 
ethanol-blended fuels across the na-
tion in 2004 (the latest year in which 
data is available). The map shows 
three main areas for ethanol usage: 
California, the upper Midwest, and 
New York and Connecticut. The Cali-
fornia and New York markets are 
the largest reformulated gasoline 
markets; even before the phase-out 
of MTBE, ethanol had captured a 
sizable portion of those markets. 
The upper Midwest market was 
mainly on the conventional gasoline 
side, with cheaper, locally sourced 
ethanol and state-level incentives 
and mandates. But ethanol usage 
outside of these markets was small 
to non-existent. In 15 states, no 
ethanol-blended fuel was sold. In 
13 additional states, use of ethanol-
blended fuel was below 5 percent. 
So ethanol has several additional 
markets it could potentially tap into. 
And the lower prices we are now 
seeing for ethanol provide some 
economic incentives for gasoline 
blenders to target ethanol-blended 
fuels in the southern United States, 
New England, and the Pacifi c North-
west, where ethanol has not tradi-
tionally been sold.
Pricing Factors
Table 2 displays the price incentives 
for blending ethanol. To obtain a 
consistent series of publically avail-
able prices, the calculations shown 
here use gasoline and ethanol rack 
prices from the Omaha, Nebraska, 
market for January and September 
of 2007. In January, a gallon of gaso-
line was priced at $1.49 per gallon 
while a gallon of ethanol was $2.26 
per gallon. At these prices, an E-
10 blend cost 7.7¢ more per gallon 
Table 1. Ethanol blending by region, July 2007
Figure 3. Usage of ethanol-blended fuel by state in 2004
?
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Policy Choices 
If, as seems likely, we are entering 
a future where policy incentives 
will be skewed toward rewarding 
production activities that reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, then it 
is important for the U.S. biofuels 
industry to take steps to ensure that 
they are providing low-carbon fuels. 
The key factors determining carbon 
emissions for corn-based ethanol 
are (1) whether coal or natural gas is 
used to power the ethanol plant, (2) 
whether distillers grains are dried or 
sold wet, and (3) whether expan-
sion of corn acreage comes mainly 
from reduced acreage of lower-val-
ue crops or if idled land is brought 
into production. 
The fi rst of these factors 
is largely under the control of 
ethanol plant owners. Not drying 
distillers grains is feasible only if 
large beef feedlots or dairies are 
located near the ethanol plants. 
State and local policies that en-
courage strategic siting of cattle 
operations can greatly enhance 
ethanol’s low-carbon credentials. 
The last factor is beyond the con-
trol of industry. Conversion rates 
of idled U.S. cropland can be re-
duced by increasing domestic con-
servation incentives, such as CRP 
rental rates. But this policy deci-
sion creates a dilemma: if U.S. land 
is kept idle through higher conser-
vation payments, there will be a 
larger impact on crop prices and a 
greater incentive for farmers in oth-
er countries to expand production. 
If this overseas production were to 
involve conversion of substantial 
amounts of idle land that would 
otherwise never be brought into 
production, then U.S. corn ethanol 
likely would not be able to lay claim 
to the title of low-carbon fuel. ◆
Is Corn Ethanol a Low-Carbon Fuel?
Continued from page 3
than regular unleaded before taxes. 
Even after accounting for the etha-
nol blender’s tax credit, the E-10 
blend was still 2.6¢ more. In Sep-
tember, the price of gasoline had 
risen to $2.30 per gallon, while etha-
nol had fallen to $1.93 per gallon. 
With these prices, the E-10 blend is 
3.7¢ less expensive before taxes and 
8.8¢ less after federal taxes. This 
large incentive to blend ethanol has 
only increased with recent further 
declines in ethanol prices.
Ethanol Logistics, Demand, and 
Policy Effects
Several companies are moving to add 
ethanol-blending capacity and relieve 
Table 2. Blending economics
what some have called a blending 
bottleneck. For example, Gulf Etha-
nol out of Houston is looking to build 
the fi rst ethanol blending facility 
near the port of Houston, taking 
advantage of existing rail and barge 
shipping lines. And the market for 
ethanol through conventional gaso-
line continues to grow. Florida has re-
cently allowed two E-85 pumps to be 
operated in the state and will likely 
have E-10 expansion throughout 
the state in the near future. Hawaii, 
Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, 
Oregon, and Washington have all 
followed Minnesota’s move to set 
renewable fuels standards or ethanol 
mandates. California will allow blend-
ers to move from 5.7 percent blends 
to E-10 blends on January 1, 2010.
While most of the economic 
and political incentives are pointed 
toward increases in ethanol blend-
ing, other policy changes may come 
down the line in terms of govern-
ment support. As part of the farm 
bill debate in Congress, the Senate 
Finance Committee has approved 
the “Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, 
and Horticulture Act of 2007.” The 
bill provides funding and budget 
offsets for several agricultural 
programs. One of the provisions of 
the bill is a 5¢ reduction, to 46¢ per 
gallon, in the ethanol blender’s tax 
credit once U.S. ethanol production 
exceeds 7.5 billion gallons per year. 
However, with ethanol being priced 
below gasoline, the incentives are 
still there to blend ethanol, even 
with the possible reduction in gov-
ernment support. ◆
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Recent increases in retail food prices have consumer groups looking for culprits. One con-
tributor is the cost of raw agricul-
tural commodities. Figure 1 shows 
a time series of nominal price 
indexes (1997 = 100) for corn, soy-
beans, hogs, cattle, and milk dating 
back to 1996. As shown, the prices 
of all commodities except hogs are 
currently up about 40 percent with 
almost all of the growth occurring 
in the last year. A variety of rea-
sons have been offered for this in-
crease, including increased ethanol 
production, income-led increases in 
food demand in Asia, supply disrup-
tions in Europe and Australia, and a 
weak dollar.
There are two separate mecha-
nisms by which a weak dollar leads 
to higher U.S. prices. First, when 
the currencies of buyers of U.S. ex-
ports appreciate relative to the dol-
lar, then buyers fi nd that the price 
they have to pay for U.S. goods has 
fallen when prices are expressed in 
their now stronger domestic cur-
rencies. Lower foreign-denominated 
prices boost demand for U.S. prod-
ucts and result in higher dollar-de-
nominated prices. This is the usual 
explanation for why U.S. prices rise 
with a weak dollar.
But, there is an additional 
mechanism that comes into play 
that involves the value of the dol-
lar relative to the currencies of U.S 
competitors in export markets. 
If the currency of a major export 
competitor strengthens relative to 
the dollar, then the demand for U.S. 
exports rises even if the currency of 
the buyer does not change relative 
to the dollar. 
To measure the infl uence of the 
dollar’s value on commodity prices 
requires a measurement of the 
Exchange Rates and Agricultural 
Commodity Prices
value of the dollar relative to the 
currencies of both buyers of U.S. 
exports and competitors. Figure 2 
presents infl ation-adjusted cur-
rency indexes compiled by USDA’s 
Economic Research Service. From 
its peak value in 2001 and 2002, the 
dollar value has fallen substantially. 
But most of the decrease happened 
before the run-up in agricultural 
commodity prices. Either there is 
a long lag in the response of U.S. 
prices to a change in the value of 
the dollar or recent commodity 
price increases are caused primar-
ily by other factors. ◆
Figure 1. Nominal price indexes of selected commodities (1997=100)
Source: USDA-ERS
Figure 2. Currency indexes (infl ation adjusted) of U.S. dollar value 
against that of competitors and buyers of U.S. exports 
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